the work of W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson, Rorty attempts How long this can last, I don't know. It seems to be the product of a wealthy, leisured elite which has time t o worry about this kind of thing, time to imagine alternative futures. The world may not permit the existence of this kind of elite much longer.
HRP:
Could the ironic, poetic worldview characteristic of this elite ever become the property of the masses? Rorty: Yes. I think that the success of secularization in the industrialized democracies suggests that. The 16th and 17th-century notion that man would never be able t o let go of religion has turned o u t t o be wrong. The promise of the Enlightenment came true: that you could have a society which had a sense of community, without any religious agreement, and indeed without much attention to God at all. If you can secularize a society like that, you can probably de-metaphysicize it also.
HRP: Given their training in metaphysics and similar fields of thought, what purpose could our current professors of philosophy serve in such a culture? Rorty: I think that the main purpose they've served in the past has been to get past common sense, past common ways of speaking, past vocabularies; modifying them in order to take account of new developments like Enlightenment secularism, democratic governments, Newton, Copernicus, Darwin, Freud.
One thing you can count o n philosophy professors doing is what William James called "weaving the old and the new together," in order to assimilate weird things like Freudian psychology with moral common sense. Thomas Nagel wrote a good article in the New York Review of Books on how Freud's thought has become a part o f o u r moral c o m m o n sense. I think t h a t illustrates t h e process nicely.
Philosophers have helped with that process.
HRP: So philosophers are professional renderers of coherent worldviews?
Rorty: Yes, and the reason they'll probably always be around is that there will always be something exciting happening [in culture] that needs to be tamed and modified, woven together with the past. This is the question that Foucault raises. You then ask political questions about whom you want it to work for, whom you want to run things, whom you want to do good to; which come prior to philosophical questions. Then let democratic politics be what sets the goals of philosophy, rather than philosophy setting the goals of politics.
HRP:
Whereas Habermas seems to think that if you don't have philosophy out there as point man, telling society and politics where to go, then you're somehow stuck.
HRP: Do you have doubts about the same things that people like Habermas do, namely, that the sort of large-scale discourse about values that is needed in a democratic state can go on without an extralinguistic norm of rationality, a "master narrative"? Rorty: Not really. I don't see why Habermas thinks it can't go on. H e has this view that every assertion is a claim t o universal validity, and that if you give up thinking of assertions in that way, you won't be able t o take yourself seriously, or take communication seriously, o r take democracy seriously. I just don't see the reasoning there. It's something like what [Hilary] Putnam thinks, when he claims that we need a "substantive" notion of truth. I never got that one either.
HRP: Perhaps such notions are meant to capture the idea of a certain responsibility that attaches to our utterances. Rorty: Yes, but that seems an unnecessary detour in the attribution of responsibility. I think we ought to be able to be responsible to our interlocutors without being responsible to Reason or the world or the demand of universality or anything else.
Is there a way to change current patterns of education and acculturation in order to bring this sense of responsibility about? Rorty: I don't know. But I think that a lot of that change has been accomplished by the gradual emergence of literature as the primary alternative t o science. Philosophy, at the moment, is son of occupying a halfivay position between the sciences and literature. But just for that reason, it's tending to fall between two stools and to be ignored by intellectuals. Philosophy in the English-speaking world is simply not a big deal to most intellectuals, and the reason is that the weight of nonscientific culture has been thrown over to literature. The philosophers, in turn, are viewed by most as being nostalgic for the days when science was the name of the game. 

HRP: Is the situation changing in philosophy?
Rorty: Not that I can notice, at least in the English-speaking countries. It's going to be very difficult for analytic philosophy, given its professional self-image, ever to outgrow its association with the so-called hard sciences. That association really doesn't exist in non-Anglophone philosophy, and that's why I think it's going to be hard for the two [traditions] ever to merge. Rorty: I would hope not. Founding a school is relatively easy. You can set up a problematic within which a generation can happily pursue professional activity, but you can never quite tell whether you've actually done something useful, or simply encouraged further, decadent Scholasticism.
HRP: Hilary Putnam, analyzing parts of your critique o f reason in his
One of the things I rather like about people like Derrida is that they have no real disciples. Derrida has a lot of American imitators (none of whom, I think, is any good), but he really is inimitable. There's no such thing as a "Derridian problematic." H e doesn't give anybody any work to do -nor does Harold Bloom. And I admire that.
HRP:
It might be argued that while your work has helped to dismantle a number of traditional philosophical dualisms, the ironist worldview you espouse seems itself to culminate in a strict dualism of the public and the private. You say that we should read some authors (Nietzsche, Derrida) in order to enrich our private, poetic existences, but others (Rawls, Mill) should be read in order to make ourselves better citizens of a liberal democracy. Is this distinction tenable? If our private beliefs are prevented from informing the social sphere, then what substance do they have? Rorty: I don't think private beliefs can be fenced off [from the public sphere]; they leak through, so to speak, and influence the way one behaves toward other people. What I had in mind in making the distinction was this: the language of citizenship, of public responsibility, of participation in the affairs of the state, is not going to be an original, self-created language.
Some people, the ones we think of as poets or makers, want to invent a new language -because they want to invent a new self. And there's a tendency to try to see that poetic effort as synthesizable with the activity of taking part in public discourse. I don't think the two are synthesizable; but that doesn't mean that the one doesn't eventually interact with the other.
When people develop private vocabularies and private self-images, people like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Derrida, it's very unclear what impact, if any, this will ever have on public discourse. But over the centuries, it actually turns out to have a certain impact.
If a reader of Heidegger, for example, is struck not only by the idiosyncratic, "world-disclosingn accomplishment of his writings, but is also attracted by his vision of responsiveness to Being as the fundamental aim of man, how will this attraction show up in public behavior?
Rorty: I don't know, but I think it pays to bear in mind that during the 1950s and 60s, Heidegger managed to grab hold of the imaginations of all the interesting people in Europe. When Habermas, Foucault, and Derrida were in school, Heidegger was "their" philosopher. What they each made of him was, God knows, very different, but it's clear that we won't be able to write the intellectual history of this century without reading Heidegger. Just as there were 16 different ways of reacting to Hegel in his day, there were 16 different ways of reacting t o Heidegger; and I think it's pointless to ask what was the "true" message of either Hegel or Heidegger -they were just people to bounce one's thoughts off of.
But you have written in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity that "as a philosopher of our public life," Heidegger is "at best vapid, and at worst sadistic." Is the sense of using Heidegger that you were discussing there a different sense than the one we're talkingabout here? Rorrv: I t h i n k t h a t "Idon'tthinkprivatebeliefrcanbe attempts to get a fenced off;. they leak through) so to speak, tried to get a message out of Nietzsche, and Nietzsche would have been appalled by it. And people who attempt to get a political message out of Derrida produce something perfectly banal. I suspect it isn't worth bothering. But that's not to say that these figures will always be publicly useless. Having a great imagination and altering the tradition in insensible ways is going to make a difference in public affairs somewhere down the line. We just don't know how.
HRP: Given your view that our epoch is one of increasing secularization, what do you make of the existence in this country of a fundamentalist, religious Right that does have a noticeable effect on public policy? This seems to show that traditional religion and other forms of non-ironic belief are alive and well in the public sphere. Rorty: I think it's what happens whenever you have a middle class that gets really scared and defensive. It starts to look around for ways of dividing society into sheep and goats, in order to scapegoat somebody. The American middle class has excellent reason to be scared about its economic hture, and the economic future of the country. The more there is of this fear, the more you'll see cults, quasi-fascist movements, and things of that sort, all the stuff we classifjr as the "crazy Right." HRP: What is there to stave that off, beside economic recovery? Rorty: My hunch is that the normal cycle of boom and bust doesn't matter much, as long as the long-term average income of the middle class keeps going down, and the gap between rich and poor keeps growing. I don't think there's anything that's going to reverse that. I don't have any optimistic suggestions.
Are you then a pessimist about the future? Rorty: I'm not confident enough in economics to say anything, but all the predictions about how the globalization of the labor market will effect the standard of living in the industrialized democracies seem to me fairly convincing. I think that as long as the standard of living of the middle class in the democracies is in danger, democratic government is in danger. HRP: You once described yourself as a Upostmodern bourgeois liberal." Given that self-designation, how do you see the contemporary academic Left, a Left alternately informed by the Frankfurt School thinkers and the French post-structuralists? Rorty: That designation ["postmodern bourgeois liberal"] was supposed to be a joke. I thought it was a cute oxymoron -but no one else seemed to think it was around Dissent. Irving Howe and people like that.
There's also what I regard as a pretty useless, Foucaultian Left, which doesn't want to be reformist, doesn't want to be social democratic. Fredric Jameson is a good example of that sort of Left. I can't see it as having any sort of utility in America; it seems merely to make the Left look ridiculous.
What d o you think has been the effect o f the contemporary, Foucauldian academic Left on American universities? Do you agree with the criticisms often leveled against left-leaning academics these days? Rorty: The Foucauldian Left is about two percent of the faculties at American universities, and it isn't very important, except that it gives the Right a terrific target. It's enabled the Right to generate an enormous amount of hostility against the uyw'
